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NOTE
SAFETY VALVE CLOSED: THE REMOVAL OF
NONVIOLENT OUTLETS FOR DISSENT AND THE ONSET
OF ANTI-ABORTION VIOLENCE
"It is bad enough," opined the New York Times two days after the
murder of abortion doctor Barnett Slepian, "that conservatives in
Congress and in state legislatures are working to dismantle reproduc-
tive rights by banning certain procedures, such as so-called partial
birth abortion, and by requiring waiting periods and parental consent
before an abortion can be obtained. But those restrictions are at least
imposed by the normal give and take of political and judicial struggle
in democracy. What is outrageous is the attempt to shut down abor-
tion by illegal means - by shooting the doctors or bombing the clinics
or harassing the women seeking to exercise their constitutional right."'
The New York Times does not usually devote its lead editorial to
murders in upstate New York. But Dr. Slepian's killing, of course,
was no ordinary street crime. In addition to the personal horrors of
murder - Slepian was shot in his home, leaving his wife without a
husband and his four children without a father 2 - the slaying evoked
a sense of political horror as well. As major newspapers across the
country proclaimed, Slepian's murder was especially outrageous be-
cause it was committed by an opponent of abortion trying to achieve
his goals through violence, rather than through the normal give and
take of democratic politics. 3
This normal give and take of democratic society provides dissenters
with a range of peaceful methods to achieve their goals. Dissenters
can vote for candidates who share their views, petition their legisla-
tures to change laws, and distribute literature alerting other citizens of
their concerns. In addition, they can conduct peaceful protests and
engage in other forms of nonviolent civil disobedience. These outlets
I Editorial, Violence Against Abortion Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1998, at A2o (emphasis
added).
2 See Jim Yardley & David Rohde, Abortion Doctor in Buffalo Slain; Sniper Attack Fits Vio-
lent Pattern, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, '999, at Ai.
3 See, e.g., Editorial, Fatal Terror, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1998, at Ax6 ("[D]issent is a sign
of a healthy democracy. Violence is a cancer that can never be tolerated, for it threatens the life of
the entire system."); Editorial, Murder Is Not a Form of Protest, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, x998, at 30
("[Slepian's murder] was a cowardly and contemptible act by an extremist using bullets to achieve
ends that have not been attained by reasoned persuasion."); Editorial, One More Terrorist Act,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1998, at A16 ("This violence should be seen for what it is, an effort to sub-
vert our system of laws."); Editorial, The Shooting of Dr. Slepian, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, x998, at
A22 ("[Slepian's murder] marks the extent to which some objectives of the antiabortion movement
are being achieved not by politics but by simple terrorism.").
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function as a "safety valve," providing a range of nonviolent options
for dissent and thus reducing the likelihood that a group will choose
violence to achieve its goals.4
After at least 150 years in which America's passionate abortion dis-
course found expression through nonviolent outlets, the past three dec-
ades have witnessed repeated incidents of anti-abortion5 violence. In
the same period, two legal shifts have dramatically reduced the range
of nonviolent avenues for abortion opposition. First, in finding a con-
stitutional right to abortion, Roe v. Wade6 removed the option of legis-
lative prohibitions. Second, in the early I990s, the introduction of
buffer zones' and access laws imposing heavy penalties for nonviolent
interference with clinic operations" restricted protests and virtually
eliminated the use of civil disobedience.9
This Note examines abortion opposition over the past two centuries
and the extent to which recent trends toward violence have followed
from the elimination of major nonviolent methods of dissent. Part I
explores the history of abortion opposition prior to Roe, noting that
opponents during this period relied almost exclusively on legislative
action to effect change. Roe removed this principal nonviolent outlet,
and the first wave of anti-abortion violence in American history en-
4 Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 832, 836 (D. Conn. 1970) ("In part, the First
Amendment acts as a 'safety valve' and tends to decrease the resort to violence by frustrated citi-
zens.") (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. .357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); see also
Bruce Ledewitz, Perspectives on the Law of the American Sit-In, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 499, 524
(995) ("[C]ivil disobedience offers.., a 'safety valve' that channels the powerful emotions of dis-
affected groups into illegal, but more or less acceptable, forms. At least the sit-in tends toward
normal politics and not toward revolutionary violence."); infra pp. 1222-25.
5 This Note will use the term "anti-abortion" to describe abortion opponents. This is not to
deny those activities conducted by many abortion opponents that make their movement "pro-life"
as opposed to merely "anti-abortion." See, c.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Opinion, When Words
Cheapen Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. io, 1995, at Ai9 (noting that, although given scant media atten-
tion, many abortion opponents support "financial aid to single mothers, shelters for mothers and
children with AIDS, [and] parenthood classes"). However, as this Note is chiefly concerned with
activities specifically directed toward eliminating legal abortion, "anti-abortion" seems more ap-
propriate. Furthermore, as many pro-life commentators have noted, the violence that this Note
addresses is simply not consistent with the pro-life ethic. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Quan-
dary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson From the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 882 (1999)
("The violent fringe ... discredits the entire pro-life cause because they are not pro-life, but are
violent, dysfunctional, dangerous hypocrites whose acts are not representative of pro-life values.").
6 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (994); Hill v. Thomas,
973 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Colo. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 564 0999).
8 See, e.g., Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE), i8 U.S.C. § 248 (I994)
(imposing prison terms of up to one and a half years for clinic interference).
9 See infra p. 1219; see also Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 569 ("In the past, one did not have to
be fanatically committed to a cause in order to sit-in. The protestor did not face, by and large,
serious fines and jail-time.... That situation is changing.").
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sued.10 Even within this post-Roe violence, an examination of the rise
and fall of mass nonviolent civil disobedience in the late i98Os and the
dramatic increase in anti-abortion violence beginning in the early
199os indicates that anti-abortion violence is closely related to the re-
pression of nonviolent outlets for dissent.
Part II of this Note demonstrates that the relationship between the
elimination of nonviolent channels for dissent and the onset of violence
has enjoyed broad and deep support in legal and social discourse.
Judges, journalists, legal scholars, social scientists, and nonviolent ac-
tivists have all articulated the principle that preserving nonviolent
avenues of dissent helps avoid violence. This principle has been virtu-
ally ignored in our national abortion discussion" and, if recognized,
would have important implications for future lawmaking.
The goal of this Note is to contribute to a better understanding of
the causes of anti-abortion violence. Recognition that the removal of
certain nonviolent options may result in anti-abortion violence does
not excuse the bombings and murders; rather, exploring a likely cause
contributes to the process of ending the violence, a goal shared by citi-
zens on both sides of the abortion debate.' 2 The Boston Globe was
correct to note that such violence is "a cancer" and a threat to our sys-
tem of government; 13 for precisely this reason, we should seek a deeper
understanding of the causes of anti-abortion violence, so that it may be
eliminated. Ultimately, this Note suggests that the causes of anti-
abortion violence run deeper than such vogue explanations as "the in-
cendiary statements of pro-lifers comparing abortion to murder," or
"the religious fanaticism of most anti-abortion activists."1 4  Such
"explanations" do well to demonize those with a different point of
10 See JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN
ABORTION WAR 6 (1998) ("[Roe] forced Americans to add a new phrase to their political lexicon:
anti-abortion violence."). Recognizing the role of Roe in the onset of anti-abortion violence does
not necessarily present an argument for its reversal; indeed this Note presents no such argument.
See infra p. 1226. However, policymakers cannot seriously attempt to end or limit anti-abortion
violence without delving into its causes. Understanding the role of Roe is vital to discerning
which measures might reduce the violence and which ones unwittingly exacerbate it.
11 A few commentators have articulated this concern. See, e.g., Anthony Flint, Some Say Law
Too Harsh on Abortion Foes, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1995, at 8.
12 See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Abortion Clinics Preparing for More Violence, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1993, at Ax (quoting a statement of the United States Catholic Conference that "killing in
the name of pro-life makes a mockery of the pro-life cause.... In the name and in the true spirit
of pro-life, we call on all in the pro-life movement to condemn such violence in no uncertain
terms").
13 Fatal Terror, supra note 3, at A16.
14 See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Opinion, Right to Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A29 (noting
"the essential truth about most anti-abortion activists" that "[tihey are religious fanatics"); Vio-
lence Against Abortion Doctors, supra note i, at A20 (warning that "accusations by some anti-
abortionists that abortion providers are committing murder[] can only fuel more terrorism").
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view; after more than two decades, they have done nothing to halt
the violence.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION OPPOSITION TACTICS
BEFORE AND AFTER ROE V. WADE
Concerted efforts to limit or ban abortion did not begin in the
United States until 182 1. Prior to that time, abortion, at least early in
pregnancy, was unrestricted; according to one scholar, it was "neither
prohibited nor uncommon. ""
A. Opposition Prior to Roe
In 1821 Connecticut passed the nation's first anti-abortion statute,
which banned the use of poisons to conduct abortions, perhaps to pro-
tect women's health. 16 By 1828 Missouri, Illinois, and New York had
all passed similar laws. 7 Thus, when citizens were first motivated to
oppose abortion, they did so through legislative action, beginning a
pattern that would last for at least 150 years.
Legislative action continued throughout the i8oos. By 186o twenty
states had enacted abortion laws; another forty statutes were passed
between 186o and 188o.18 The American Medical Association (AMA)
launched "an aggressive campaign against abortion [] ... lobbying
hard in state legislatures and courts ... to enact new restrictions. " 19 In
1859 the AMA unanimously approved a report deeming abortion the
"unwarrantable destruction of human life."20 Detroit physicians exco-
riated abortion providers as "inhuman wretches," 21 and the anti-
abortion crusade manifested a spirit of "gather[ing] the righteous under
one banner, to seek out and destroy the foe." 22
The press and religious leaders joined the medical community in
this vivid rhetoric. The New York Times condemned abortion in an
1871 article titled The Evil of the Age, noting that "thousands of hu-
15 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 28 (2d ed. 1992). See
generally JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 18oo-19oo, at 3-20 (1978).
16 See TRIBE, supra note i5, at 28-29; see also DALLAS A. BLANCHARD, THE ANTI-
ABORTION MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: FROM POLITE TO
FIERY PROTEST 12 (1994) ("[The Connecticut law] seems to have been aimed not at abortion
itself but at the use of poisons as abortifacients, which put the life of the woman at risk.").
17 See MOHR, supra note 15, at 25-27.
IS See RISEN & THOMAS, supra note io, at 9.
19 Id. This legislative response from physicians appears to have had both moral and economic
underpinnings. See BLANCHARD, supra note 16, at 12; TRIBE, supra note 15, at 30.
20 MOHR, supra note i5, at i57.
21 Id. at 161 (quoting J.J. Mulheron, Foeticide, io PENINSULAR J. MED. 385, 389 (1874)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
22 Id. (quoting WILLIAM G. ROTHSTEIN, AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 174 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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man beings are ... murdered before they have seen the light of this
world. '23  Similarly, the New York Tribune criticized "[t]he murder of
children, either before or after birth. '24 In 1869, Bishop Spaulding of
Baltimore stated: "The murder of the infant before its birth is ... as
great a crime, as would be the killing of a child after birth."25 A
popular Congregationalist minister condemned abortion in an 1867 ar-
ticle titled Fashionable Murder.26 The Maine Conference of the Con-
gregational Church described the practice as "the darkest picture that
reason or taste could allow" and suggested that it was worse than "the
horrors of intemperance, of slavery and of war."27
These descriptions of abortion - as murder, as the moral equiva-
lent of killing children after birth, as a horror worse than slavery or
war - brought the same response that concern for the mother's health
had prompted earlier in the century: petitioning of legislatures. Abor-
tion opponents "organized an effective media and lobbying cam-
paign, '28 "lobb[ied] hard in state legislatures, '29 and worked to "alter[]
the prevailing attitudes" about abortion 30 and to "mobilize[] public
opinion."3' No violence - absolutely none - is reported.
The consistent pattern of abortion opposition through legislative
action continued and grew through the end of the nineteenth century,
bringing a significant increase in the number of abortion-related stat-
utes. 32 Ultimately, "Victorian-era morals" virtually eliminated legal ac-
ceptance of abortion at the close of the nineteenth century, with law-
makers "craft[ing] ever-tighter abortion restrictions."33 While abortion
was the subject of considerable legislative action, historical records
again indicate no anti-abortion violence.
The legislative action of the late i8oos gave way to a first half of
the twentieth century "remarkably free from debate about abortion. 3 4
23 The Evil of the Age, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1871, at 6.
24 MOHR, supra note 15, at 18o (quoting N.Y. TRIB., Jan. 27, 1868) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
25 Id. at I86 (quoting Pastoral Letter of the Most Reverend Archbishop and Suffragan Prelates
of the Province of Baltimore, at the Close of the Tenth Provincial Council 9-1i (May 1869)).
26 See id. at 187 (citing John Todd, Fashionable Murder, 52 CONGREGATIONALIST &
BOSTON RECORDER 45 (1867)).
27 Id. at 188-89.
28 TRIBE, supra note 15, at 30.
29 RISEN & THOMAS, supra note io, at 8.
30 TRIBE, supra note 15, at 30.
31 Id. at 34; see also MOHR, supra note 15, at 199 (deeming legislation "[tihe chief manifesta-
tion" of abortion opposition).
32 See RISEN & THOMAS, supra note Io, at 9. Despite increasing restrictions, abortion ap-
pears to have been fairly common throughout much of the nineteenth century; one 1871 study by
the American Medical Association suggests that as many as one million abortions were performed
per year. See BLANCHARD, supra note x6, at 15.
33 RISEN & THOMAS, supra note IO, at 9, io.
34 TRIBE, supra note 15, at 34.
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Abortion returned to national prominence in the 195oS, with a push to
liberalize or repeal America's abortion laws driven largely by Planned
Parenthood and the population control movement.35 Pro-reform forces
and the wholesale social changes of the i96os coalesced for a
"[l]egislative [c]rescendo" that began in 1967.6 That year, the AMA
issued a statement favoring liberalization of abortion laws, and twenty-
eight state legislatures considered liberalization bills. 37 A i968 Presi-
dential Advisory Council on the Status of Women called for the repeal
of all abortion laws.38 By 1970 twelve states had passed liberalization
laws,39 and four states - Hawaii, New York, Alaska, and Washington
- had repealed their abortion restrictions entirely.40
The anti-abortion response to these developments once again fo-
cused almost exclusively on legislative action.4' Some groups also of-
fered support for pregnant women and alternatives to abortion, and
others offered counseling about the dangers of abortion.42 In addition,
abortion opponents distributed pamphlets with "grisly" pictures of
aborted fetuses 43 (much as they would in later decades), and the Ro-
man Catholic church attacked abortion from the pulpit, holding days
of mourning for legislators who supported "murder."44 Even during
this period in which abortion was "a fiercely controversial issue, '45 not
a single act of violence is reported.
B. The Court Closes a Door and Anti-Abortion Violence Begins
When the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade in 1973, abortion
opponents who had previously sought change through their legislatures
could no longer use that outlet to prohibit abortion.46 The majority
35 See RISEN & THOMAS, supra note io, at io. Of course, these reforms occurred in an era
characterized by dramatic changes in American culture. See, e.g., BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG &
DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 5 (1993) (deeming Roe v. Wade to
have "registered an ongoing political struggle by women for equal rights and self-determination").
36 TRIBE, supra note 1S, at 42.
37 See id. at 38, 42.
38 See id. at 46.
39 See id. at 42.
40 See BLANCHARD, supra note i6, at 25.
41 See RISEN & THOMAS, supra note ic, at 20 (noting the "emergence of state level anti-
abortion lobbying campaigns").
42 See BLANCHARD, supra note 16, at 82-83.
43 See TRIBE, supra note 15, at 50.
44 See id. at 47-48; see also RISEN & THOMAS, supra note io, at 21 (recounting a single sit-in,
which ended quietly "without any arrests, after Planned Parenthood obtained a court order and
the demonstrators complied with a police request to leave").
45 Warren Weaver, Jr., High Court Rules Abortion Legal the First 3 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 1973, at 1.
46 To be sure, the legislative process remains available for debates about limits on abortion in
the third trimester, dilation and extraction abortion (also known as "partial-birth abortion"), pa-
rental notification provisions, and waiting periods. For a detailed and up-to-date account of the
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premised its recognition of a constitutional right to abortion on its in-
ability to determine when life begins.47 To Roe's critics, of course, this
seemed exceedingly uncertain ground upon which to remove abortion
from the realm of ordinary legislative politics. 48
Professor Tribe describes the result best: "Roe's recognition of a
constitutionally protected right to decide whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy shut the door to direct political action to restrict abor-
tion .... 49 Abortion opponents felt they had been stripped of their
political power to effect democratic change.50
Shortly after this removal of abortion from the political process, the
first incidents of anti-abortion violence occurred. The National Abor-
tion Federation (NAF) reports that, between 1977 and 1983, 149 inci-
states in which these types of restrictions have been passed, please see The Alan Guttmacher Inst.,
The Status of Major Abortion-Related Laws and Policies in the States (visited Feb. 7, 2000)
<http://www.agi-usa.orglpubs/abort_law-status.html> (on file at the Harvard Law School Li-
brary). While these sorts of legislative battles certainly allow for political action, these restrictions
seem more symbolic than substantive because they do not apply to the vast majority of abortions.
Even those critical of efforts to end abortion have recognized that these provisions are mainly a
substitute for the legislative determinations abortion opponents desire. See, e.g, Hope Clinic v.
Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 (7 th Cir. i999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) ("These statutes, remember, are
not concerned with saving fetuses, with protecting fetuses from a particularly cruel death, with
protecting the health of women, [or] with protecting viable fetuses .... They are concerned with
making a statement in an ongoing war for public opinion...."); Ellen Goodman, Abortion Poli-
tics Won't Go Away, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1999, at E7 ("Frankly, I preferred the old days
when the right-to-life strategy was at least principled. Prolifers lobbied for a flat-out ban on abor-
tions. They were out front about their goals. But having lost this argument with the public, the
strategy has shifted from trying to make abortion illegal to trying to make it impossible.").
47 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) ("We need not resolve the difficult question of
when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of
man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.").
48 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 28 (1975) ("[Mioral
philosophy, logic, reason, or other materials can give no answer [to the question when the individ-
ual's interests should trump society's].... Should not the question then have been left to the po-
litical process, which in state after state can achieve not one but many accommodations, adjusting
them from time to time as attitudes change?").
49 TRIBE, supra note is, at 16 (emphasis added). In her comparative study of abortion law in
20 Western nations, Professor Glendon notes that this removal of abortion from the legislative
arena is unique to American law: "From the comparative point of view abortion policy in the
United States appears singular, ... because our abortion policy was not worked out in the give-
and-take of the legislative process." MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN
WESTERN LAW 24-25 (x987).
50 Cardinal Cooke expressed this sense of disempowerment:
Whatever their legal rationale, seven men have made a tragic utilitarian judgment re-
garding who shall live and who shall die. They have made themselves a 'super legisla-
ture[.]' They have gone against the will of those American people who spoke their
minds in favor of life as recently as last November in referendums in Michigan and
North Dakota. They have usurped the powers and responsibilities of the legislatures of
so states to protect human life.
Statements by 2 Cardinals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, i973, at 20.
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dents of violence against abortion providers occurred,* including eight
bombings and thirteen arsons. This wave of anti-abortion violence
reached its peak between 1984 and 1986. In 1984 alone, there were
eleven bombings and fourteen arsons at abortion clinics. The violence
continued to rise, with 148 incidents in 1985, the highest single-year
total in the I98os. It remained high in 1986, with 133 incidents.
The wave of violence receded sharply between 1987 and 199o. The
violence dropped precipitously from a high of 148 incidents in 1985 to
a low of 53 incidents in 1988, a decline of almost seventy percent in
only three years. The average number of violent incidents per year
from 1984 to 1986 was 138, while the average level between 1987 and
199o was barely half that, at 70 incidents per year. This drop pre-
ceded the well-documented explosion of anti-abortion violence that
began in the early 199os and continues today.
5
'
C. The Rise and Fall of Mass Nonviolent Civil Disobedience
(1987-1990)
Despite plummeting violence in the late x98os, statistics from the
NAF suggest that radical anti-abortion activists had not disappeared;
rather, they had merely altered their tactics. In 1987 abortion oppo-
nents began using mass nonviolent civil disobedience. Operation Res-
cue, the group that orchestrated these demonstrations, was founded in
1987 by Randall Terry, an activist who had spent much of 1986 mus-
tering support for his "proposed national campaign of civil disobedi-
ence."5 2 By the summer of 1987, Terry had "astonished other activists
by successfully attracting significant numbers of Protestant fundamen-
talists" to join his campaign. 3  The large-scale civil disobedience
against abortion clinics that began in 1987 represented a test-run for
* Unless otherwise noted, all statistics on mti-abortion violence are from the NAF's Incidents
of Violence and Disruption Against Abortion Providers, z999, which can be found at
<http://www.prochoice.orglviolence/extreme.htm> (visited Feb. 7, 2ooo). The NAF tracks "inci-
dents of anti-choice violence and harassment against abortion providers." National Abortion Fed-
eration, Clinic Violence (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.prochoice.org/violence/index.htm>. In
addition, "NAF also acts as an advocate for provider protection with all levels of law enforce-
ment; issues timely information alerts about anti-choice violence; maintains a data bank of re-
search on militant anti-choice groups and individuals; and serves as an information clearinghouse
for abortion providers seeking assistance with safety and security." Id.
51 See, e.g., Judith Havemann, Clinton Seeks Funds for Abortion Clinic Security, WASH.
POST, Jan. 22, 1999, at A21 (noting the "escalating violence ... since x99i"); Carl Weiser, Anti-
Abortion Violence Increased, Groups Say, USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 1998, at 7A (noting that, in 1997,
violence reached its highest level since 1993, and bombings reached their highest level since 1984).
52 RISEN & THOMAS, supra note io, at i8l, 205.
53 Id. at x8x.
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that tactic; 4 with its emergence, the rate of anti-abortion violence fell
by more than forty percent in just one year."5
By 1988 mass civil disobedience had become even more common
- the NAF reports that 188 clinic blockades and more than I1,ooo as-
sociated arrests occurred that year. The blockades brought with them
another dramatic decline in clinic violence, with only 53 incidents in
1988. The rise in nonviolent civil disobedience and the corresponding
decline in violence also coincided with what was then an all-time high
of 1,590,75o abortions performed in 1988.56 Large-scale demonstra-
tions continued in 1989 - the NAF reports 201 clinic blockades - as
did the reduced level of violence - 77 incidents in 1989 and 74 in
199o. That year, more than 1.6 million abortions were performed,
breaking the record set just two years earlier.5 7
Operation Rescue's civil disobedience campaign, however, would
be short-lived. In 1989 and 199o, abortion-rights supporters began to
win large court judgments against Operation Rescue for their block-
ades.58 Protesters began receiving longer jail terms, and police began
using "pain-compliance techniques" to remove uncooperative activ-
ists.5 9 By 199o the New York office of Operation Rescue owed
$450,000 in fines; the national office closed the same year, unable to
pay a similar amount.60 In 1991 alone, the National Organization of
Women won injunctive and monetary awards against the group in Cali-
fornia, Massachusetts, Oregon, Pennsylvania, New York, and Florida.61
In addition to this increased litigation, large-scale civil disobedience
faced a new threat: clinic access laws. In the spring of 1989, Maryland
passed the nation's first such law, prohibiting interference with entry
or exit from a medical facility by "physically detaining the individual
54 See Anti-Abortion Protesters Close New Jersey Clinic, CHI. TRIB. WIRE SERVICE, Nov.
30, 1987, at 4, available in 1987 WL 3000206 (noting that "[m]ore than 200 anti-abortion demon-
strators were arrested... on minor trespassing charges during a peaceful sit-in" that Operation
Rescue deemed "a warmup for larger protests planned" in other areas); RISEN & THOMAS, supra
note io, at 261 (describing a Pro-Life Action Network meeting as a "field test planning meeting").
55 See also BLANCHARD, supra note 16, at 54 (noting that Operation Rescue emerged at the
same time as a "leveling off of bombings and arsons" occurred); Karen Swallow Prior, Symposium:
Special to Insight, 15 INSIGHT MAG., Feb. i5, 1999, at 25 available in 1999 WL 8673654 (noting
that the lull in violence occurred "exactly at the height of Operation Rescue's demonstrations").
56 See RISEN & THOMAS, supra note io, at 376.
57 See id. The 199o number still stands as the highest in U.S. history. See Alan Guttmacher
Inst., Facts in Brief: Induced Abortion, 1998 (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/
fb_induced.abort.html> (on file at the Harvard/Law School Library).
58 See BLANCHARD, supra note 6, at 93, 94; see also RISEN & THOMAS, supra note io, at
301-08 (reporting that in 1989 "Operation Rescue was beginning to lose the initiative both to the
courts and to its abortion-rights opponents").
59 BLANCHARD, supra note 16, at 92. Pain compliance involves "inflicting pain to compel
compliance with arrest." Id.




or obstructing, impeding or hindering the individual's passage. '62 This
"Interference with Access to Medical Facilities Act" was the first of
many similar laws passed at the local and national levels 63 in direct re-
sponse to the mass protests led by Operation Rescue.
64
Clinic access laws and courtroom losses spelled an end to mass
nonviolent civil disobedience aimed at abortion providers.65  Some
demonstrations continued, but the total number of blockades never
again reached even half of the levels of i988 and 1989.66 Since Con-
gress passed the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act in 1994,
clinic blockade protests have been in single digits every year but one.
67
D. A "More Serious Explosion": The Deadly Violence of the 199os
The civil disobedience that disappeared as a primary tactic of anti-
abortion radicals did not go unreplaced. On the heels of the lower lev-
els of violence of the late i98os, the early 199os saw a change in tactics
and a rise in anti-abortion violence. 68  Violence rose slightly from 74
incidents in 1990 to 95 in I 9 9I. 6
9
In addition to the stifling of nonviolent civil disobedience, abortion
opponents faced another setback in 1992 when the Supreme Court de-
cided Planned Parenthood v. Casey.70 Casey technically concerned
Pennsylvania's restrictions on abortion (such as a 24-hour waiting pe-
riod and mandatory husband notification)71 and became a vehicle for
the reconsideration of Roe. After nineteen years of being unable to
achieve their goal through the legislative process, abortion opponents
62 Robert Barnes, Schaefer Signs Bill fior Clinics; Law Prohibits Blocking Entries, WASH.
POST, May 26, 1989, at Bi ("[Blocking clinic entries] is punishable by a fine of up to $I,ooo or a
jail term of not more than go days.").
63 The Alan Guttmacher Institute currently reports that 14 states have access laws. See The
Alan Guttmacher Inst., supra note 46. In addition, Congress enacted the Federal Freedom of Ac-
cess to Clinic Entrances Act in 1994. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
64 See Robert J. Hirn, Close To Home: New Protection for a Basic Right - Access to Medical
Care, WASH. POST, July 2, 1989, at C8 (noting that the law was suggested "after several hundred
demonstrators from a group calling itself 'Operation Rescue' effectively closed an abortion'clinic
... for a day last winter by blockading the doors").
65 See BLANCHARD, supra note 16, at 9:c (noting the "quieting of 'extreme' activism following
a federal judge's injunctions and jailings of Operation Rescue workers in Wichita Kansis");
RISEN & THOMAS, supra note io, at 314 (quoting one of the group's leaders as saying that "Op-
eration Rescue went from overnight success to overnight failure").
66 Clinic blockade numbers, according to NAF, went from 201 in 1989 to 34, 41, 83, 66, 25,
and 5 in 1990 to 1995.
67 According to the NAF, 1997 witnessed 25 such disturbances nationwide.
68 See, e.g., Deborah Epstein & Barbara Weiss, 76 MED. ECON. 5i, Will Violence End Pa-
tients' Access to Abortion?, available in I999 WL 9935623 (quoting Maureen Paul, Medical Direc-
tor of Planned Parenthood in Boston as saying "[w]e've seen an evolution in tactics from big dem-
onstrations in front of clinics to acts of terroiism, such as shooting doctors or bombing clinics").
69 See BLANCHARD, supra note i6, at 54 (noting that the rate of violence increased in i99i).
70 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
71 See id. at 844.
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believed the Court might return abortion to the "normal give and take"
of democracy.72 In the days before oral arguments, the New York Times
reported that the appeals court in Pennsylvania "effectively pro-
nounc[ed] Roe dead" with abortion opponents "cheering the... trend."73
These cheers were stifled, however, when a divided Court reaf-
firmed the central holding of Roe, with four Justices dissenting. The
dissenters were cognizant of the relationship between the availability
of democratic outlets and the avoidance of civil strife:
[B]y foreclosing all democratic outlets for the deep passions this issue
arouses, by banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all par-
ticipants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest
fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of al-
lowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs and intensifies
the anguish. 74
Casey thus added to the disappearance of nonviolent civil disobedi-
ence the assurance that abortion would remain outside the realm of
ordinary politics. Roe was reinforced: abortion was not only legal, but
could not be made illegal without amending the Constitution.
Anti-abortion violence surged to unprecedented levels, a response
that was foreseen not only by the Casey dissenters, but also by abor-
tion-rights advocates themselves. 75 There were 196 reported acts of
violence against abortion providers in 1992, more than twice the num-
ber reported in the year before Casey. In 1993, the number of inci-
dents surged to 437, including the killing of Dr. David Gunn in Flor-
ida, the first murder victim of anti-abortion terrorism. 76 As Dr.
Gunn's murder illustrates, the nature of the violence, as well as the
72 As several scholars have noted, one goal of the anti-abortion movement was to change the
federal judiciary to facilitate the overturning of Roe. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note i5, at 17. Im-
mediately following Casey, this strategy was still discussed. See Adam Clymer, Top Lawmakers
Vow to Push Abortion Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at A17 (noting the anti-abortion
strategy of "support[ing] a constitutional amendment outlawing abortion as well as the appoint-
ment of anti-abortion Federal judges"); Gina Kolata, Ruling Inspires Groups to Fight Harder,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1993, at A17 (quoting an abortion opponent as saying that "I really think
we need a new Supreme Court justice or a new constitutional amendment").
73 Editorial, Roe v. Wade: Still Good Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at A16.
74 Casey, 5o5 U.S. at 1002 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined in his dissent by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas. Any hopes of adding a fifth anti-Roe
Justice were dashed in November, when Bill Clinton, a supporter of abortion rights, won the
presidency.
7S See Felicity Barringer, Abortion Clinics Prepare for More Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
1993, at Ax (quoting a clinic administrator as indicating that "[wle've all been saying and worry-
ing that the violence was going to escalate"); Felicity Barringer, Abortion Clinics Said to Be in
Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1993, at 6 (quoting Eleanor Smeal of the Fund for Feminist Majority
as saying that "[alt a meeting right after the election, we predicted there would be an upswing in
clinic violence as a result of shift in Administration").
76 See Editorial, The Death ofDr. Gunn, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A28 (calling the mur-
der "the latest escalation in a crescendo of violence by anti-abortion activists").
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numbers, began to change. From 1991 to 1992, arsons more than dou-
bled from 8 to i9; vandalism almost tripled from 44 incidents to 116;
hate mail and harassing phone calls jumped from 142 to 469. From
1992 to 1993, stalking of clinic employees became prevalent enough to
warrant maintenance of statistics for the first time; in an ominous pre-
cursor to Gunn's murder, death threats increased to nine times their
previous level. The post-Casey, post-Operation Rescue era witnessed
more frequent and more deadly violence than ever before.
This increased violence continues to this day."7 Since 1993 seven
abortion clinic employees have been murdered, and "[a]ttempts have
been made on the lives of more than a dozen others ... ; clinic bomb-
ings and fires are no longer unusual events.""' Last year, the Clinton
Administration proposed $4.5 million in security spending in response
to "the escalating components of the wave of abortion-related violence
over the last decade - 733 cases of vandalism, 146 arsons, 38 bomb-
ings and seven murders." 79
Thus the history of abortion opposition - and within it, the history
of anti-abortion violence - indicates that the current strategy of in-
creased restrictions of nonviolent outlets may be tragically miscalcu-
lated as a means of preventing violence. As courts and legislatures
have foreclosed nonviolent outlets for dissent, violence has increased.
Continuing to impose and multiply such restrictions on nonviolent
abortion opposition8 ° threatens to place more lives in danger and to
exacerbate, rather than eliminate, the violence of the 199os.
II. THE REPRESSION OF NONVIOLENT AVENUES OF DISSENT
AND THE ONSET OF VIOLENCE
The understanding that the removal of nonviolent outlets and the
onset of violence are closely related has deep roots in the United States
and elsewhere. In this Part, I will explore these roots and discuss some
reasons why this relationship has been virtually ignored in our na-
tional abortion debate.
77 See Timeline, Flashes of Violence, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 25, I998, at 44; Carl Weiser, Anti-
Abortion Violence Increased, Groups Say, USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 1998, at 7A.
78 One More Terrorist Act, supra note 3, at A6.
79 Editorial, Good Moves to Counter Abortion Clinic Violence, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 18, 1999, at Aii, available in 1999 WL 6582546; see also Havemann, su-
ra note 51, at A21.
80 Governments continue to multiply the penalties for nonviolent abortion dissent. See Opin-
ion of the Justices to the Senate, No. SJC-o8145, 2000 WL io8886 (Mass., Jan. 24, 2000) (describ-
ing a proposed Massachusetts law which would impose jail terms of up to two and a half years
for protesting twice within 25 feet of an abortion provider).
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A. Broad and Deep Support for Safety Valve Theories
The notion that nonviolent action provides a safety valve is often
traced to Justice Brandeis's 1927 concurrence (joined by Justice
Holmes) in Whitney v. California.," Brandeis and Holmes suggested
that the Founders understood this important function of providing
nonviolent outlets for dissent: "[Those who won our independence]
knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment
for its infraction; ... that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to
discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies .... ,,82
The theory that nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the
likelihood of violence did not, however, originate with Justice Bran-
deis.83 Rather, the idea became prominent in i9x9 and 1920, with the
nation in the throes of "anti-Bolshevik hysteria," as liberal journals
such as The Nation and The New Republic were warning that repres-
sion makes violent outbursts more likely.8 4 The likelihood that repres-
sion of nonviolent outlets would fuel violence was perhaps best stated
by a writer in Century, who analogized repression to a dam about to
burst - invariably resulting in the "banking up of a menacing flood of
sullen anger behind the walls of restriction."85 Suppression frequently
"driv[es] the passions of the situation underground, there to gather
fresh strength for an even more serious explosion six months or a year
later."8 6
Permeating this "free speech as safety valve" literature is a par-
ticular emphasis on the relationship between free speech and the
democratic process. That is, free speech provides a safety valve be-
cause our system allows dissident speech to have an effect by influ-
81 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
82 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
83 See Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America's "First Freedom,"
1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557, 56x (igg) ("[O]ur present way of thinking about free
speech did not spring from the foreheads of clever jurists. Ordinary people nurtured it, wrote
about it, experimented with it, and argued over it endlessly in dealing with real problems they
found urgently in need of resolution.").
84 Id. at 6og-io (citing Danger Ahead, NATION, Feb. 8, igi9, at x86, 186 (noting that repres-
sion "is turning thoughtful working people into dangerous radicals"); and Freedom of Speech:
Whose Concern?, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, i919, at 102, 103 (suggesting that repression is only
"for those whose desire is revolution")).
85 Bobertz, supra note 83, at 611 (quoting Glenn Frank, Is Free Speech Dangerous?,
CENTURY, July, 1920, at 355, 359).
86 Id. This view of free expression is still widely accepted today. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMER-
SON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12 (1963) ("[S]uppression
drives opposition underground, leaving those suppressed either apathetic or desperate. It thus
saps the vitality of the society and makes resort to force more likely."); GERALD GUNTHER &
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1027 (3th ed. 1997) ("[F]ree speech pro-
motes political stability by providing a safety valve for dissent.").
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encing the democratic processA7 Thomas Emerson, for example, notes
that free expression "is particularly significant for political decisions. '88
Professor Zechariah Chafee, whose first edition of Freedom of Speech
became influential as the safety valve theory was gaining recognition
in the 1920s,89 described "the great strength of our argument against
violent-talking radicals" as follows:
[W]e could say to them: "It is true that in the countries that you came
from you naturally resorted to violence because you had no vote and could
not abolish the abuses to which you objected. It is not so in this country.
If you want a change, go and vote for it, vote for men who have promised
to bring it to pass." 90
Chafee argued that, by depriving dissidents of the opportunity to enact
change through the legislature, this powerful argument evaporates,
rendering violence more likely to occur.91
The notion that preserving nonviolent channels for dissent reduces
violence has also received support from several social science studies of
domestic conflict. Like legal theorists, many conflict scholars agree
that free expression and political participation serve as outlets for pas-
sionate opposition. Within this literature, scholars view activists as
having a "repertoire of action"; their choice of what type of action to
employ depends, at least in part, on government actions:
It is also widely recognized that the occurrence of violence depends on the
actions of both parties to the conflict. Groups in conflict with rivals, or
with authorities, have choices about how to press their claims. Their op-
ponents similarly have choices about how to respond. The shape and ex-
tent of violence depend on the kinds of choices made by both groups.
This implies a third point, that authorities have substantial responsibility
for violence .... 92
This emphasis on the impact of alternative outlets on the incidence
of violence is also described in Harry Eckstein's review of conflict lit-
erature, in which Eckstein observes that, under at least one theory of
collective violence, "a clear relationship would show up between the
incidence of collective political violence and the availability of alterna-
87 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Ap-
proach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1324
(1983) ("The Supreme Court's shift from [repression] encouraged dissidents to forgo violent tactics
in favor of participation in the established political process.").
88 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (197o); see also
EMERSON, supra note 86, at 9 (noting that the power of free expression to influence political ac-
tion is important because "[i]t is through the political process that most of the immediate decisions
on the survival, welfare and progress of a society are made.").
89 See Bobertz, supra note 83, at 609 ("If any one source of ideas had the greatest impact, how-
ever, it was Zechariah Chafee's book, Freedom of Speech.").
90 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 281-82 (2d ed. 1941).
91 See id. at 281.
92 THEODORE GURR, 2 VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 13 (1989).
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tive channels of making and realizing 'claims."' ' 93 Eckstein notes that
this theory is supported by the fact that civil conflict is much less
deadly in democratic nations than in other regimes, which "must be
due to a toleration in democracies of protests that, in repressive re-
gimes, never surface, or else are forced to take virulent forms."94
Similarly, Mark Irving Lichbach has noted that, while there is sup-
port for the idea that repression deters dissident activity, "[r]epression
frustrates demands and fosters a sense of injustice," perhaps causing
"[a] hard core of the opposition group [to] become highly dedicated, or-
ganized, and deadly."95 Analyzing choices among violent and nonvio-
lent avenues of dissent, Lichbach found that "an increase in govern-
ment's repression of nonviolent activities may reduce the level of
nonviolent activities of an opposition group but increase the level of its
violent activities" because "the relative costs of nonviolent activities to
the opposition group have been raised."
96
The recognition of a causal connection between repression of non-
violent action and the onset of violence is not confined to the academic
arena. Rather, the most successful and revered nonviolent political ac-
tivist in United States history, Martin Luther King, Jr., subscribed to
the very same principle. In Why We Can't Wait,97 King writes that, in
1963, "[f]or the first time in the long and turbulent history of the na-
tion, almost one thousand cities were engulfed in civil turmoil, with
violence trembling just below the surface." 98 King believed that "the
knife of violence was ... close to the nation's aorta" and that only the
presence of nonviolent outlets for dissent prevented "the dark threat of
violence [from] erupt[ing] in blood."99 He explained:
The Negro has many pent-up resentments and latent frustrations, and he
must release them. So let him march; let him make prayer pilgrimages to
the city hall; let him go on freedom rides - and try to understand why he
must do so. If his repressed emotions are not released in nonviolent ways,
93 Harry Eckstein, Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence, in
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL CONFLICT: THEORY AND RESEARCH 135, I50 (Ted Robert Gurr
ed., i98o).
94 Id. at 151.
95 Mark Irving Lichbach, Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Re-
pression and Dissent, 31 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 266, 270 (1987).
96 Id. at 293. A recent study in the American Journal of Political Science tested Lichbach's
conclusions against observed acts of intranational conflict and concluded that, among available
theories to explain reaction to government coercion, the Lichbach explanation "is the most prom-
ising" and "fares very well when put to the test." Will H. Moore, Repression and Dissent: Substi-
tution, Context, and Timing, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 85 I, 870 (1998).
97 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (i964).
98 Id. at 2.
99 Id. at 4-5.
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they will seek expression through violence; this is not a threat but a fact of
history. 100
B. The Abortion Debate: A Failure to Learn From History and Theory
After the murder of Dr. David Gunn, the New York Times sug-
gested that former Presidents Reagan and Bush had encouraged the
violence through their "noisy commitment to overturning Roe v.
Wade."10 1 One columnist for the Times went even further and blamed
the violence on "the essential truth about most anti-abortion activists,"
that "[t]hey are religious fanatics."'102 Similar explanations dominated
the mainstream press six years later when Dr. Barnett Slepian was
murdered, as both the CBS Evening News and the New York Times
suggested that the violence was attributable to the strong rhetoric of
the anti-abortion movement. 10 3 'Considering that the morally charged
debate over abortion has continued for at least a century and a half,104
these "explanations" appear more bluster than substantive analysis;
they tell us little about why a subject that has always been fiercely but
nonviolently contested suddenly turned violent. 105
One reason that policymakers have not seriously and openly con-
sidered the role of government restrictions in anti-abortion violence
may be a fear that doing so would assign blame in a politically un-
popular way. When Professor 'ribe was presented with the safety
valve argument as set forth by civil libertarians such as Harvey Sil-
verglate, Nat Hentoff, and Professor David Cole, he deemed the ar-
gument to be "blaming the victim in the most perverse way."'01 6 This
focus on the blame value of anti-abortion violence suggests a half-
hearted consideration of its causes, with politically unpopular ones
100 Id. at 91 (emphasis added). King was joined in these beliefs by Gandhi: "[I1t is no easy task
to restrain the fury of a people incensed by a deep sense of wrong.... [T]he only way to avoid
violence is to enable them to give such expression to their feelings as to compel redress." Le-
dewitz, supra note 4, at 523 (quoting Gandhi).
101 The Death of Dr. Gunn, supra note 76, at A28.
102 Lewis, supra note 14, at A29.
103 See Jeff Jacoby, What Real Hate Speech Sounds Like, Opinion, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 2,
1998, at Aig (quoting Violence Against Abortion Doctors, supra note i, at A2o).
104 See supra pp. 1213-14 (recounting rhetoric of murder, war, destruction, infanticide, and
slavery from a variety of nineteenth century sources, none of which reports any violence).
105 This is not to imply that all media discussions of anti-abortion violence are so myopic. See,
e.g., Murder is Not a Form of Protest, supra note 3, at 30 ("It is grossly unfair to ... pretend that
the extremists represent the mainstream organizations of the anti-abortion movement .... Pas-
sionately embraced causes sometimes attract disturbed individuals. People who regard abortion
as the unjustified taking of human life should not be condemned merely because they have vigor-
ously argued that point of view.").
106 Flint, supra note I i, at 8 (quoting Professor Tribe). Tribe is responding to Silverglate's sug-
gestions that "[w]e are reaping what we have sown," and that "[h]ad these techniques been in ef-
fect during the civil rights battles of the '6os, you can be assured there would have been a lot
more violence than there was." Id.
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eliminated without serious consideration. To the extent that lawmakers
share this approach, our failure to arrive at a solution is unsurprising.
Furthermore, policymakers may fear undermining their own posi-
tions on Roe. Those who favor the decision are naturally loath to con-
sider that the decision may have had negative consequences. More-
over, abortion-rights advocates benefit from the opportunity to charac-
terize the opposition as fanatical and gain both popular and political
strength from the rallying point provided by violence that can be
characterized as the result of anti-abortion views. 107
A fear of undermining Roe by recognizing the relationship between
nonviolent and violent dissent might be misplaced. While this Note
presents evidence that Roe spurred anti-abortion violence by removing
the primary nonviolent outlet for opposition, constitutional decisions
cannot be evaluated solely on whether a violent reaction is likely to oc-
cur. Consider, for example, Brown v. Board of Education, which con-
tributed to violence by mandating the desegregation of public schools,
and yet is widely considered a wise and just decision. Furthermore,
the majority in Roe removed abortion from the "normal give and take"
of legislative politics because of a view that the Constitution required
them to do so; regardless of one's opinion of Roe, the fact that some
members of society will violently disapprove is not, in itself, a sound
basis on which to interpret the Constitution.
However, when considering the ongoing tide of access laws and
buffer zones, the correlation between the removal of nonviolent outlets
and the onset of violence is critical. Access laws restrict nonviolent
protest and civil disobedience with the explicit goal of preventing vio-
lence and increasing access to abortion.108  The patterns of anti-
abortion violence, however, suggest that further limiting nonviolent
protests - either by increasing penalties for interfering with access or
by establishing buffer zones within which activists cannot demonstrate
or distribute literature - is counterproductive; such limits appear to
have contributed to the increase of violence. Moreover, evidence sug-
gests that access was actually better before access laws, and that the
drastic rise in anti-abortion violence in the I9gos has reduced access
107 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILITY, MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF
DEMOCRACY 215 (1998) (noting that in the context of buffer zones, "the practical effect of this
tactic is to enlist the aid of the state in making one side's protests ineffective"); Amy Waldman,
Killing of Doctor Who Performed Abortions Becomes a Factor in Political Races, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 1998, at B5 (suggesting that publicity from the shooting was particularly beneficial for
Charles Schumer's Senate campaign against abortion opponent Alfonse D'Amato).
10s See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994) (setting forth the congressional purpose in enacting FACE
as follows: "to protect and promote the public safety and health and activities affecting interstate
commerce by establishing Federal criminal penalties and civil remedies for certain violent, threat-
ening, obstructive, and destructive conduct that is intended to injure, intimidate, or interfere with
persons seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health services").
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more than the nonviolent protest behavior that gave rise to access
laws. In the early 199os, fewer doctors were learning to perform abor-
tions, and observers noted that "this trend may become more pro-
nounced if violence continues."' 0 9 Between 1992 and 1996, when the
violence reached unprecedented levels, more than fourteen percent of
abortion providers stopped providing services." 0 The NAF has noted
that "a shortage of trained providers and continued threats of violence
are important barriers to access.""' Furthermore, by 1996 there were
roughly fifteen percent fewer abortions performed than in i990,112 and
the number dropped even further in 1997, to its lowest level since
i975." ' Observers across the country have suggested that the recent
wave of anti-abortion violence has played a role in reducing access." 4
CONCLUSION
However policymakers react to the relationship between nonviolent
outlets and violent dissent, one thing is clear: further restrictions on
nonviolent dissent should be avoided. Governments at all levels pos-
sess the power to direct existing abortion opposition toward outlets
that are more acceptable than bullets and bombs. Our legal institu-
tions are capable of channeling violent dissent into more civil behavior;
for them to do so, our leaders must resist the temptation toward
squelching all dissent, even that which is nonviolent. As politically
popular and seemingly innocuous as access laws and buffer zones may
be, by preventing nonviolent dissent, they contribute to a climate in
which violent dissent is more likely. Such policies ignore what Martin
Luther King, Jr., called "a fact of history," and risk "driving the pas-
sions of the situation underground, there to gather fresh strength for
an even more serious explosion."' '1 As the casualty numbers continue
to rise, and as citizens on all sides of the abortion issue seek an end to
the violence, a more responsible public policy is needed.
109 Carol J.C. Maxwell, Introduction: Beyond Polemics and Toward Healing, in PERSPECT-
IVES ON THE POLITICS OF ABORTION 13 (Ted G. Jelen ed., 1995); see also Warren M. Hem,
Hunted By the Right, Forgotten by the Left, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1993, at 21 (noting that the rise
in violence and the increased costs of security may mean that "skilled practitioners become scarce").
110 See Epstein & Weiss, supra note 68, at 5x (suggesting that violence is ending access).
111 Id.
112 See Alan Guttmacher Inst., supra note 57.
113 See U.S. Abortion Rate Is Lowest Since '75, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2ooo, at Ai5 (citing re-
duced access as a factor).
114 See Murder is Not a Form of Protest, supra note 3, at 30 (observing that "militant anti-
abortion activists have discouraged many physicians from doing the procedure"); One More Ter-
rorist Act, supra note 3, at AI6 ( "The mostly quiet protesters ... have become snarling and con-
frontational .... The tactic has worked. More than 8o% of U.S. counties have no abortion pro-
viders."); Fatal Terror, supra note 3, at A16 ("The brutality sends a chill through every women's
clinic in the country and may be responsible for a decrease in services.").
115 Frank, Is Free Speech Dangerous?, supra note 85, at 359.
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